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The Year of the Gun: Second Amendment Rights
and the Supreme Court
Glenn Harlan Reynolds* & Brannon P. Denning**
The Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in the District of Columbia gunban case promises to make this Term “The Year of the Gun.”1 Though the
Court will review many other important cases, the Heller case presents a
unique constellation of characteristics: It involves the scope of a right that
many Americans regard as highly important, but that has not been significantly addressed by the Supreme Court before, and it does so in an unusually
open national election year, with no incumbent or obvious successor running
for president. Though the Court did address Second Amendment issues
somewhat in the 1939 case of United States v. Miller,2 the treatment was
limited, and uninformed by opposing counsel because only the federal
government was represented.3 The Court’s decision in Heller will thus give
the Justices a chance to address—or to duck—a number of important Second
Amendment issues and may also pose potential difficulties for the Court’s
existing jurisprudence of unenumerated rights, in a setting in which the political ramifications are likely to be obvious and immediate.
I.

Issues that Can Be Avoided

One issue that the Court will be able to duck, because it isn’t present
here, involves the incorporation of the Second Amendment into the
Fourteenth. Because the District of Columbia is not a state, but part of the
federal government, no incorporation issue appears. Of course, that also
means that, regardless of the decision in Heller, the incorporation question
will remain for future cases.
In addition, the often-discussed question of what sort of weapons fall
within Second Amendment protection should be easy for the Court to avoid
should it choose to do so. The Heller plaintiffs are not asking for the right to

* Beauchamp Brogan Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Tennessee. J.D., Yale
Law School, 1985.
** Professor of Law and Director of Faculty Development, Cumberland Law School, Samford
University. J.D., University of Tennessee, 1995; LL.M., Yale Law School, 1999. Author of GUN
CONTROL AND GUN RIGHTS: A READER AND GUIDE (NYU Press 2002) (with David B. Kopel and
Andrew J. McClurg).
1. See Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted sub nom.
District of Columbia v. Heller, No. 07-290 (U.S. Nov. 20, 2007).
2. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
3. See Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Telling Miller’s Tale, 65 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 113 (2002).

Electronic
Electroniccopy
copyavailable
availableat:
at:https://ssrn.com/abstract=1084924
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1084924

2008]

The Year of the Gun

23

possess machine guns, bazookas, or nuclear weapons, but ordinary firearms
whose inclusion within any individual-rights view of the Second Amendment
is unlikely to raise difficult questions.
The Heller case may also allow the Court to avoid, for the moment, any
line drawing regarding the extent to which state or federal laws involving
licensing or registration of firearms, or requiring licenses for public carrying
of firearms, are permissible under an individual-rights view of the Second
Amendment. The District of Columbia gun ban under question is so draconian that it can plausibly stand only if the Court finds no individual right to
arms at all.
II.

Issues that Cannot (Easily) Be Avoided

Other issues will require a decision. The most significant is the
question whether the Second Amendment protects some sort of individual
right to own guns, or merely a “collective right” of states to arm militias.
That question is squarely presented in Heller, as is recognized by the Court’s
own statement of the issue:
Whether the following provisions — D.C. Code secs.
7-2502.02(a)(4), 22-4504(a), and 7-2507.02 — violate the Second
Amendment rights of individuals who are not affiliated with any
state-regulated militia, but who wish to keep handguns and other
firearms for private use in their homes.
Some observers read the Court’s statement of the issue to presuppose
the existence of some sort of individual right,4 but that seems less clear to us.
But the Court can hardly avoid answering this question in deciding the
case—or, at least, it cannot do so without contortions that would have made
it more politic to simply deny the petition for certiorari.
Even if the Court concludes that the Second Amendment protects an
individual right, it must then articulate a standard of review to, in Richard
Fallon’s usage, “implement” the Amendment5 by articulating “decision
rules” to guide it and lower courts in future cases.6 The Court could thus recognize an individual right while prescribing a deferential standard of review
that permits anything short of outright prohibition7—think Kelo’s review of
“public use.”8 Even if the Court were to announce a more rigorous standard,

4. Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/uncategorized/
court-agrees-to-rule-on-gun-case/ (Nov. 20, 2007, 13:02 EST)
5. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001).
6. See Mitchell A. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 15 (2004)
(describing a two-stage process of constitutional interpretation: the fixing of constitutional meaning
and the articulation of decision rules to implement that meaning).
7. See, e.g., Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683
(2007).
8. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
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there is always the possibility that it will be applied in a relaxed fashion.
Pace Gerry Gunther, “strict in theory” is not necessarily “fatal in fact.”9
III. The Lower Courts’ Role
Even if the Court prescribes a nondeferential standard of review, lower
courts—dismissive of, even hostile to, Second Amendment claims in the
past10—will have the responsibility for applying it. Unless the Supreme
Court is willing to reverse judges who don’t toe the line, applications of the
Court’s rules in particular cases could sap an individual-rights decision of its
strength. To cite a recent example, lower courts’ stingy applications of
Lopez11 and Morrison,12 which limited the scope of the Commerce Clause,
were barely distinguishable from willful defiance.13
IV. Enumerated and Unenumerated Rights
Last summer, before the Supreme Court granted certiorari, Professor
Michael O’Shea wrote on the Concurring Opinions blog that the Supreme
Court would face a problem if it rejected an individual-rights reading of the
Second Amendment. Most Americans, he argued, would compare:
the Court’s handling of the enumerated rights claim at issue
in Parker, and its demonstrated willingness to embrace even
non-enumerated individual rights that are congenial to the
political left, in cases like Roe and Lawrence. “So the
Constitution says Roe, but it doesn’t say I have the right to
keep a gun to defend my home, huh?”14
We found this argument compelling enough to predict—wrongly—that
the Supreme Court would probably choose not to hear the case. But the tensions that a rejection of the individual-rights position would raise regarding
the Court’s jurisprudence of unenumerated rights in areas like abortion,
sodomy, or contraception may encourage some Justices to go along with an
individual right in the Second Amendment context (perhaps fudging on the

9. Cf. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8
(1972).
10. See Brannon P. Denning, Can the Simple Cite Be Trusted? Lower Court Interpretations of
United States v. Miller and the Second Amendment, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 961 (1996).
11. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
12. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
13. See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance: The New
Commerce Clause Jurisprudence Encounters the Lower Courts, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1253 (2003);
Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Lower Court Readings of Lopez, or What if the
Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came?, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 939
(2000).
14. Posting of Mike O’Shea to Concurring Opinions, http://www.concurringopinions.com/
archives/2007/07/the_second_amen_1.html (July 16, 2007, 19:10 EST).
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standard of review) rather than face the political consequences that Professor
O’Shea pointed out. On the other hand, some members of the Court who are
unfriendly to the jurisprudence of unenumerated rights might find such an
obvious contradiction congenial. And those—if there are any—on the Court
who consider decisions in light of national elections might weigh the likelihood that a finding of no individual right could affect the elections by
energizing gun-rights supporters, or possibly gun-control supporters, to become more involved and to turn out in higher numbers.
V.

Conclusion

Arguably, gun-rights supporters have much more at stake in Heller than
their opponents. The Court’s adoption of the individual-rights reading may
be little more than symbolic; if not, it may take years before the Court deigns
to clarify its decision. But a rejection of their position would virtually repeal
the Amendment, perhaps emboldening gun-control proponents whose initiatives were often stymied by legislators’ invocation of the Second
Amendment. On the other hand, a loss might galvanize political action, as
losses in Kelo and Bowers v. Hardwick did for property-rights and gay-rights
activists.
But the Court, too, has something at stake—its legitimacy. If the Court
ignores millions of Americans’ belief that the Amendment protects some individual right while continuing to invalidate laws infringing on
unenumerated rights, the Court might hazard its de facto interpretive
supremacy. As Laurence Tribe reminds us, when there is “a deep national
dissatisfaction with the way constitutional law . . . has . . . resolved a matter,”
“We the People” seek constitutional amendments.15 Four times in the past,
Article V has been used to reverse Supreme Court cases deemed deeply
flawed. Heller could occasion a fifth.

15. Laurence H. Tribe, A Constitution We Are Amending: In Defense of a Restrained Judicial
Role, 97 HARV. L. REV. 433, 436 (1983).
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